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This paper presents an action-based fine-grained access controlmechanism for structured documents. Firstly, we define a describing
model for structured documents and analyze the application scenarios. The describing model could support the permission
management on chapters, pages, sections, words, and pictures of structured documents. Secondly, based on the action-based access
control (ABAC) model, we propose a fine-grained control protocol for structured documents by introducing temporal state and
environmental state. The protocol covering different stages from document creation, to permission specification and usage control
are given by using the Z-notation. Finally, we give the implementation of our mechanism and make the comparisons between the
existingmethods and ourmechanism.The result shows that ourmechanism could provide the better solution of fine-grained access
control for structured documents in complicated networks. Moreover, it is more flexible and practical.
1. Introduction
The various handheld devices, represented by tablets and
smart phones, have brought a novel and collaborative way
to access information. It satisfies the increasing requirement
for individualized service and makes the information mul-
tidimensional in such open networked environment. As a
result structured documents, which integrate both content
and layout, have become a key information representation
in the networked environment of cloud computing, mobile
computing, and pervasive computing. While providing the
original feeling and the same user experience as paper-based
publications, it has speeded up the information transmission
significantly. Research on structured documents contains
document modeling, analysis, and recognition. At present,
the readers and digital contents become more and more
various. We expect that the structured document is stable
in layout and flexible in content. The content of structured
document not only could be texts and pictures, but also
integrate both 2D and 3D elements. Moreover, it could
interact with the users as well. With the rapid increasing of
data represented by structured documents, the granularity
of the access control is changing from the whole document
to its objects, and the requirement for interaction and
permission specification has emerged. However, the current
access controlmodel and permissionmanagement aremainly
realized based on operation system, database, and large-scale
information system. The existing access control mechanisms
are implemented based on the whole document, so they
cannot be adapted to the current situation. Therefore, the
description and model of the access control for structured
documents have to be changed from the entire document to
specific parts of it and from coarse-grained to fine-grained.
Access control is mainly used to solve the problem of data
sharing and permission assignment. In the initial stages of
access control, there weremodels such as discretionary access
control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC). These
models have mapped users and permissions directly. Later,
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role based access control (RBAC) was proposed by introduc-
ing the role concept, which has assigned permission to roles
instead of users. With the development of the network, the
access control models based on temporal state and location
have been presented for the purpose of privacy protection.
The models could activate and inactivate periodic role or
describe how to use the location information in permission
determination [1–4]. The wide application of digital commu-
nications makes the network become an open, distributed,
and complicated system, which supports mobile computing
and cloud computing as well. In order to accommodate the
distributed environment, UCONandRBAC formultidomain
[5, 6] have been proposed.The authors in [7–9] have given the
concepts of “attribute” and “action,” respectively, for the future
considerations of temporal state and environmental state. At
present, the latest challenges for access control are not only
the different requirements of security on different devices in
various environments, but also the problems of fine-grained
management when the users are crossing multiple domains.
The access control for structured document, represented
by XML, usually is implemented based on DAC, MAC, and
RBAC, without considering temporal state and environmen-
tal state. Reference [10] has presented a fine-grained MAC
model for XML documents. Its management and control
are based on properties of XML. However, because it is
based on MAC only, without considerations of temporal
and contextual information, it cannot accommodate the
demand of structured document access control at anytime
and anywhere.
To solve the aforementioned problems, we have done
research on structured document description and access con-
trol models. In this paper, we present an action-based fine-
grained access control mechanism for structured documents
by extending the model of [9]. Based on the analysis of appli-
cation scenarios, we also provide the corresponding security
protocols. The protocols take advantage of the current signa-
ture encryption technology to ensure the integrity of access
control mechanism and provide basis for its implementation.
Therefore we can skip the security proof in detail. Finally, we
justify our method by comparing it with existing solutions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
analyzes the common application scenarios of structured
documents.The new access control mechanism of structured
documents, including model, protocols, and its implementa-
tion, are presented in Section 3. The implementation of our
mechanism will give in Sections 4 and 5 which compares
the properties of the newmechanism with current ones. And
finally we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Application Scenario Analysis
Users always expect to access any digital contents of struc-
tured documents anytime and anywhere. Moreover, they
would like to specify the permissions according their own
requirement. However, both the creators of the documents
and administrators of content servers not only do hope
to provide users with convenient and efficient service, but
also expect to implement the fine-grained access control
of structured documents simultaneously. We analyze three
common application scenarios of structured documents in
the following subsections.
(1) Document preview: content providers (CP) expect to
attract customers to buy the whole digital work by offering a
few free contents, while customers often hope to determine
the purchase intentions based on their experience of preview.
(2) Individual specification of document permissions: if
user B has already purchased the digital contents needed
successfully, he could expect to specify permissions and
constraints associated with the usage of the contents indi-
vidually. For instance, he would choose some sections to be
a new section and then specify their permission for future
usage. Therefore, the permission description of structured
documents should be fine-grained and the permissions spec-
ification of new document should be flexible.
(3) Multielement restrictions on access to documents:
there are three more aspects of the issue. Firstly, the autho-
rization of structured documents usually has a lifetime. After
the time, the documents will not be used. Secondly, the
contents servers also have restrictions on the number of
current online users to ensure the performance. Thirdly, the
users’ environmental states will play an important role in
permission assignment.
3. Action-Based Fine-Grained Access Control
Mechanism for Structured Documents
Based on the scenario analysis in Section 2, we propose an
action-based access control mechanism in this section. In the
first subsection, we present a fine-grained description for the
structured documents, as our mechanism is built on top of
it. In the second subsection, we introduce the action-based
access control model for the structured documents based on
ABAC. Finally, we describe the corresponding protocols in
the last subsection.
3.1. A Fine-GrainedDescription. Structured documents could
be described as a 5-tuple SDoc = (𝑆
𝑜
, 𝑜
𝑟
, 𝑆
𝑎
, 𝜕, sattr).
(i) 𝑆
𝑜
denotes all the objects sets of structured document
SDoc. The objects could be anything users want to
describe, such as sections, chapters, pages, sentences,
and even words.
(ii) 𝑜
𝑟
denotes the root of objects, where 𝑜
𝑟
∈ 𝑆
𝑜
, and it
is defined to implement traversal and search for other
objects.
(iii) 𝑆
𝑎
denotes all the objects’ attributes sets of structured
document. The attributes of objects could be security
level, time, location, and so on.
(iv) sattr is a binary relationship, where 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟 ⊆ 𝑆
𝑎
× 𝑆
𝑜
.
If 𝑎
1
∈ 𝑆
𝑎
, 𝑜
1
∈ 𝑆
𝑜
, and (𝑎
1
, 𝑜
1
) ∈ 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟, then 𝑎
1
is the
security attribute of 𝑜
1
.
(v) Function 𝜕 (𝜕 : 𝑆
𝑜
→ 𝑆
𝑜
) denotes the nesting
relationship between objects. If 𝑜
1
, 𝑜
2
∈ 𝑆
𝑜
and 𝜕(𝑜
1
) =
𝑜
2
, then 𝑜
1
is nested by 𝑜
2
. Assuming object 𝑜
𝑘
is
included by document 𝑑 and the object nested by 𝑜
𝑘
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Figure 1: The nesting relationship between objects.
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Figure 2: The action-based fine-grained access control model for structured document.
is represented as 𝑜
𝑘−𝑙
, 𝑙 is the nesting depth of 𝑜
𝑘
in
𝑑 when 𝑜
𝑘−𝑙
= 𝑑. So let 𝜕
𝑙
= (𝜕)
𝑙; then 𝜕(𝑜
𝑘
) =
𝑜
𝑘−𝑙
, (𝜕(𝑜
𝑘
))
2
= 𝜕(𝜕(𝑜
𝑘
)) = 𝑜
𝑘−2
, . . ., and (𝜕(𝑜
𝑘
))
𝑙
=
𝜕(. . . 𝜕(𝑜
𝑘
)) = 𝑜
𝑘−𝑙
.The nesting relationship of objects,
subdocuments, and documents could be described
by multibranches tree. The structured document is
the root of the tree, and the nested objects and
subdocuments are nodes or leaves. For instance, in
Figure 1, (𝜕(𝑜
111
))
𝑙
= 𝑜
𝑟
, 𝑙 = 3. A sensible design
of nesting depth could make the fine-grained access
control more effective.
3.2. Action-Based Access Control Model. The action-based
access control model for structured document is shown in
Figure 2. The action hierarchy (AH) and action-permission
assignment (AP) are described in [9]. The basic concepts are
defined as follows:
(i) Subject: a person or a nature agent that applies to
access the resource;
(ii) Session: a mapping between a subject and a subset of
the roles that the subject is assigned to;
(iii) Role: the description of the permission set of subject
who wants to access the object at special time and in
special place;
(iv) Time: the temporal constraint set of subject;
(v) Environment: the environmental constraint set of
subject. For instance, location, platform, and other
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objective conditions related with access control. The
system will restrict a subject’s permission according
to environment when it applies to access;
(vi) Action: the set of role, time, and environment of
subject when it applies to access;
(vii) Structured document (SDoc): the document is con-
sisted of chapters, sections, fonts, tables, and other
elements, including the syntax and semantic of layout;
(viii) Operation type (AT): what a subject could operate on
an object. Here ∀𝑎𝑡 ∈ 𝐴𝑇, and 𝑎𝑡 = (𝑟, 𝑒, 𝑎, 𝑤). The
four symbols mean read, execute, append, and write,
respectively. The actual operations such as create,
delete, and view could be abstracted to them;
(ix) Permission (P): describes the authorized operation of
a subject on a specific object, including the objects and
operation type. Here P = AT, Object;
(x) Action (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 → 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛): a mapping between
subject and action, by which a subject’s action infor-
mation could be obtained.
Definition. object is the finest granularity that a subject could
access. It is atomic and unified in security requirement. One
or more objects could combine a subdocument, and one or
more subdocuments could combine a document. We denote
the set of objects as Object, and in our model it is equal to 𝑆
𝑜
of the structured document.
In order to solve the fine-grained access control prob-
lem of structured document, we extend the model in [9]
to 6-tuple (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑆𝐷𝑜𝑐, 𝐴𝑇, 𝑃, and 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡). The
subject’s accessing requirement on objectof structured doc-
ument SDoc for operation type AT is denoted as 𝑅𝑒𝑞 =
(𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡, 𝐴𝑇, 𝑆𝐷𝑜𝑐, and 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡).
3.3. The Access Control Protocol. The structured documents
should be described in sections, pages, or even elements to
satisfy the requirement for fine-grained access control. In
order to implement our model, we define the corresponding
protocols, including document creation, permission specifi-
cation, and authority management. The symbols details are
shown as follows.
Detailed Descriptions of Symbols
Sid: subject’s/user’s ID,
Oid: object’s ID,
𝑡
𝑠
: subject’s temporal state,
𝑒
𝑠
: subject’s environmental state,
𝑇
𝑠
: starting time of policy,
𝑇
𝑒
: end time of policy,
𝑘
𝑜
: the object’s key symmetry encryption, it is gener-
ally encrypted under the subject’s private key,
at: operation type,
pd: the policy’s description, it could be described in
XML. Our paper will not discuss it in detail due to
the paper length,
Sk
𝐴
: A’s private key.
The NAME denotes the abstract data types, including the
action, role, time, environment, and structured document.
The ROLES denotes the set of roles. TSTATES denotes the set
of temporal states. ESTATE denotes the set of environmental
states.OBJECTS denotes the set of objects. POLICYS denotes
the set of policies. We give the functions for protocol in Z-
notation as follows.
(i) GenSDoc: content provider generates the structured
document SDoc in specified format (format) by
document-packaged tools.
GenSDoc (contents: NAME; out SDoc: NAME) ⊲
SDoc = format (contents); ⊳
(ii) Define Object: user divides the SDoc into sections
according to their requirement for access control.
Define Object (SDoc: NAME; out OBJECTS:
NAME) ⊲
if object ∉OBJECTS then OBJECTS’ = OBJECTS
∪{ object} ⊳
(iii) Assign Policy: user assigns the policy to the divided
SDoc and submits the result to the policy server,
where Policy = {𝑃
1
, 𝑃
2
, . . . , 𝑃
𝑘
}.
Assign Policy (Object, environment, temporal, at,
key, Ts, Te, pd: NAME; out Policy: NAME) ⊲
if policy ∉ Policy
then policy.role = role
policy.temporal = temporal
policy.environment = environment
policy.object = Object
policy.at = at
policy.k = key
policy.Ts = Ts
policy.Te = Te
policy.pd = pd
POLICYS’ = POLICYS ∪{ policy }
POLICYS= POLICYS’ ⊳
(iv) Verifyid: verify the user’s identity and certificate; if
legal, then return “True,” otherwise return “False.”
Verifyid (user, certification: NAME; out result:
BOOLEAN)
⊲result = (user ∈ U) (isvalid (certification)) ⊳
(v) GetReq: obtain the user’s requirement req.
GetReq (user, object, SDoc, at:NAME; out req:
NAME) ⊲
req.subject = user
req.at = at
req.Object = object⊳
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(vi) GetAction: obtain the information including role R,
environment E, and time T for the policy server’s
further judgment. The information received is (Role,
E, T, and Object).
GetAction (req, temporal, environment: NAME;
out action: NAME) ⊲
action.role = req.subject
action.temporal = temporal
action.environment = environment⊳
(vii) Verifyt: when the user’s requirement req and action
information action are obtained, the policy server
will validate the user’s temporal information by this
function. If valid, then return “True,” otherwise return
“False.”
Verifyt (action, validt: NAME; out result:
BOOLEAN)⊲action.temporal ∈ TSTATES; val-
idt ⊆ TSTATES
result = (∃𝑡
1
, 𝑡
2
∈ validt⋅𝑡
1
≤ action.temporal ≤
𝑡
2
)⊳
(viii) Verifye: when the user’s requirement req and action
information actionare obtained, the policy server will
validate the user’s environmental information by this
function. If valid, then return “True,” otherwise return
“False.”
Verifye (action, valide: NAME; out result:
BOOLEAN)⊲
action.environment ∈ ESTATES; valide ⊆
ESTATES
result = (∃𝑒
1
, 𝑒
2
∈ valide⋅𝑒
1
≤ action.environment
≤ 𝑒
2
)⊳
(ix) Verifyr: when the user’s requirement req and action
information actionare obtained, the policy server will
validate the user’s role by this function. If valid, then
return “True,” otherwise return “False.”
Verifyr (action, validr: NAME; out result:
BOOLEAN)⊲
action.role ∈ ROLES; validr ⊆ ROLES
result = (∃𝑟
1
, 𝑟
2
∈ validr 𝑟
1
≤ action.role ≤ 𝑟
2
)⊳
(x) JusUsage: the policy server will search the corre-
sponding policy for user according to his action and
requirement.
JusUsage (action, req: NAME; out poicy:
NAME)⊲
policy’ = (∃ policy’ ∈ POLICY (policy’.object =
req.object ∧ policy’.at = req.at))
if verifyr (action, policy’.role) then
if verify (action, policy’.temporal) then
if verifye (action, policy’.environment) then
policy = policy’ ⊳
(1) The Protocol for Structured Documents Creation. By using
corresponding tools, the owner of the resource will package
his text, video, audio, picture, and 3D objects into one digital
work and assign policies according to their own requirement
(see Figure 3). The steps of the protocol are explained as
follows.
Step 1. CP→CS the content provider CP creates the digital
work and submits it to the content server.
Step 1-1 Generate the digital content EC.
Step 1-1-1 Call the function GenSDoc() to gen-
erate the digital content C in corresponding
format.
Step 1-1-2 Call the function DefineObject()
to divide the digital content into objects
{𝑜
1
, . . . , 𝑜
𝑚
} according to the requirement.
Step 1-1-3 Generate the random number𝑁CP.
Step 1-1-4 Encrypt the objects 𝑜
1
, . . . , 𝑜
𝑚
obtained from Step1-1-2 under the session key
𝑘
1
, . . . , 𝑘
𝑚
exchanged before. The cipher text is
𝐶
󸀠
= 𝐸
𝑘
1
,...,𝑘
𝑚
(𝑜
1
, . . . , 𝑜
𝑚
).
Step 1-1-5 Generate the signature SigSkCP
(Hash(𝐶󸀠 ‖ 𝑁CP)).
Step 1-1-6Generate the final digital content EC =
{𝐶
󸀠
, SigSkCP(Hash(𝐶
󸀠
‖ 𝑁CP)),𝑁CP}.
Step 1-2 Submit the digital content EC to the content
server CS.
Step 2. CS→CP content server returns the result of new
content submission to content provider.
Step 2-1 Generate the data for result.
Step 2-1-1 Verify the information by using the
CP’s public key. If failed, go to Step 5.
Step 2-1-2 Save the digital content EC, and add
the new content information to the publishing
list. Generate the basic data Re for result.
Step 2-1-3 Generate random number𝑁
𝑐
.
Step 2-1-4 Generate the signature SigSk
𝐶
(Hash(Re ‖ 𝑁
𝐶
‖ 𝑁CP)).
Step 2-1-5 Generate the final data for returning
result Result = (Re, SigSk
𝐶
(Hash(Re ‖ 𝑁
𝐶
‖
𝑁CP)),𝑁C,𝑁CP).
Step 2-2 Send Result to content provider CP.
Step 3. CP→PS the content provider CP creates the policies
and submits it to the policy server.
Step 3-1 Generate the policy requiring data.
Step 3-1-1 Generate the policy descriptions
Pd
1
,Pd
2
, . . . ,Pd
𝑚
corresponding with the
objects of content C.
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1-1-3 generate NCP
2-1-3 generate Nc
with the objects of content C
policy Pc
1-1-4 C󳰀 = Ek1,... ,𝑚 (o1, . . . , om)
Content provider
CP
Content server
CS
Policy server
PS
Step 1 submit the new digital work
1-1-2 divide the
digital content
into objects
1-1-6 generate EC
Step 2 return to content
provider for document creation
Step 2-2 send the Result
2-1-1 verify 2-1-2 save
2-1-5 generate
Result
Step 3 create policy
Step3-2 submit policy
3-1-1 generate the policy
descriptions Pd corresponding
3-1-5 generate
3-1-2 generate
Step 4 return to content
provider for policy creation
Step 4-2 send the Result
4-1-1 verify 4-1-2 save
4-1-5 generate
Result
4-1-3 generate
Step 1-1 generate the digital content
Step 2-1 generate the return data
Step 1-2 submit
Step 3-1 generate the policy requiring data
Step 4-1 generate the data for result of policy creation
1-1-1 generate the
specific format
digital work C in
Np
N󳰀CP
EC = {C󳰀, SigSkCP (Hash(C󳰀  N )), NCPCP }‖
1-1-5 SigSkCP (Hash(C󳰀  NCP))‖
3-1-3 P = {Pd1, Pd2, . . . , Pdm}
(Hash(P ))Pc = {P, SigSkCP , N󳰀CPN󳰀CP }‖
3-1-4 SigSkCP (Hash(P ))N󳰀CP ‖
2-1-4 SigSkC(Hash(Re P))Nc NC‖ ‖
4-1-4 SigSkP(Hash(Re P))Np C‖ ‖N 󳰀
Figure 3: The process of structured documents creation.
Step 3-1-2 Generate the random number𝑁󸀠CP.
Step 3-1-3 Policy 𝑃 = {Pd
1
,Pd
2
, . . . ,Pd
𝑚
}.
Step 3-1-4 Generate the signature SigSkCP
(Hash(𝑃 ‖ 𝑁󸀠CP)).
Step 3-1-5 Generate the user’s policy 𝑃
𝑐
=
{𝑃, SigSkCP(Hash(𝑃 ‖ 𝑁
󸀠
CP)),𝑁
󸀠
CP}.
Step 3-2 Submit the 𝑃
𝑐
to policy server.
Step 4. PS→CP policy server returns result to content
provider for policy creation.
Step 4-1 Generate the data for result of policy creation.
Step 4-1-1 Verify the information by using the
CP’s public key. If failed, go to Step 5.
Step 4-1-2 Save the policy, and generate the basic
data Re for result.
Step 4-1-3 Generate the random number𝑁
𝑝
.
Step 4-1-4 Generate the signature SigSk
𝑃
(Hash(Re ‖ 𝑁
𝑝
‖ 𝑁
󸀠
CP)).
Step 4-1-5 Generate the final data for result
Result = (re, SigSk
𝑃
(Hash(Re ‖ 𝑁
𝑝
‖ 𝑁
󸀠
CP)),
𝑁
𝑝
, 𝑁
󸀠
CP).
Step 4-2 Send Result to content provider CP.
Step 5. End of Creation.
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User U Content server CS Policy server PS
Step 1 user submits his requirement for accessing
Step 1-2 submit there requirement data
1-1-3
1-1-5 generate
ACQ
Step 2 content server deals with the user’s application
2-1-1 verify the ACQ,
and obtain
2-1-3 generate
2-1-5 generate
2-1-8 generate PQ
Step 2-2 send the PQ
2-1-2 verify user’s
identity
Step 4-2 send to users
Step 3 policy server deals with the policy requirement
4-1-2 4-1-3
Step 3-2 send user’s policy
3-1-1 verify PQ,
and obtain PQR
3-1-2 search for
policy description
PD
3-1-3 match and
generate the
user’s policy
3-1-4
generate
3-1-5
generate
Step 4 return the user’s application
4-1-4 4-1-5 generate
Step 1-1 generate the requirement data
Step 2-1 generate the policy requirement data
Step 3-1 generate the policy for user
Step 4-1 generate the result
1-1-1 generate Nu 1-1-2 generate ACu
2-1-4 generate Nc
4-1-1 verify Pu obtain PRu verify Nc
4-1-8 generate ECu
NP
P u PRu
generate N󳰀c
3-1-8 generate
ACu = {sid, oid, at}
Actu = {sid, ts, es}
PQR = {Actu, oid, at}
ACu )Nu‖Hash(
PQ = {PQRu, SigSkc (Hash(PQRu Nc)), Nc}‖
ACQ = {ACu, SigSku ,Nu}( ACu ))Nu‖Hash(
2-1-6 Hash(PQRu Nc)‖
ECRu = {C󳰀, PRu}
3-1-6 Hash(PRu Np Nc)‖ ‖3-1-7 SigSk𝑝 ( PRu Np Nc))‖ ‖Hash(
Pu = {PRu, SigSkp (Hash(PRu Np Nc)), Np,Nc}‖ ‖
4-1-7 SigSk𝑐 (Hash(ECRu Nu N󳰀c))‖ ‖ 4-1-6 Hash(ECRu Nu N󳰀c)‖ ‖
NuECu = {C󳰀, PRu, SigSkc (Hash(C󳰀 PRu N󳰀c)), Nu,N󳰀c}‖ ‖ ‖
1-1-4 SigSku ( Hash(ACu ))u,N
2-1-7 SigSk𝑐 (Hash(PQRu Nc))‖
Figure 4: The process of users’ authorization.
(2) The Protocol of Authorization. User 𝑈 registers the
information to the system and obtains a role that can access
the system. When 𝑈 needs to access the resource, content
server and policy server will return the corresponding digital
content and policy according to their role, environment, and
temporal states (see Figure 4). The steps of the protocol are
explained below.
Step 1. U→CS user𝑈 submits the requirement for accessing
a digital content to content server according to the resource
list of the system.
Step 1-1 Generate the requirement data.
Step 1-1-1 Generate the random number𝑁
𝑢
.
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Step 1-2-1 Generate the requirement basic data
AC
𝑢
= {sid, oid, op}.
Step 1-3-1 Generate Hash(sid||oid||op||𝑁
𝑢
).
Step 1-4-1 Generate the signature SigSk
𝑢
(Hash(sid ‖ oid ‖ op ‖ 𝑁
𝑢
)).
Step 1-5-1 Generate the ACQ = {AC
𝑢
, SigSk
𝑢
(Hash(sid ‖ oid ‖ op ‖ 𝑁
𝑢
)),𝑁
𝑢
}.
Step 1-2 Submit the ACQ to content server.
Step 2. CS→PS content server in data center deals with the
user’s requirement.
Step 2-1 Generate the policy requirement data.
Step 2-1-1 Analyze the user’s requirement data
ACQ, and verify the data by using the user’s
public key. If failed, go to Step 5.
Step 2-1-2 Call function GetReq() to obtain the
user’s requirement req, and verify the legitimacy
of user’s identity; if failed, go to Step 5.
Step 2-1-3 Call function GetAction() to generate
the user’s action information Act
𝑢
= {sid, 𝑡
𝑠
, 𝑒
𝑠
}.
Step 2-1-4 Generate the random number𝑁
𝑐
.
Step 2-1-5 Generate the user’s policy require-
ment basic data PQR = {Act
𝑢
, oid, op}.
Step 2-1-6 Generate PQ Hash = Hash(sid ‖ 𝑡
𝑠
‖
𝑒
𝑠
‖ oid ‖ at ‖ 𝑁
𝐶
).
Step 2-1-7 Generate signature SigSk
𝑐
(PQ Hash).
Step 2-1-8 Generate the policy requirement data
PQ = {PQR
𝑢
, SigSk
𝑐
(PQ Hash),𝑁
𝐶
}.
Step 2-2 Send PQ to the policy server.
Step 3. PS→CS the policy server in data center deals with
the user’s policy requirement.
Step 3-1 Generate the policy for user.
Step 3-1-1 Analyze the policy requirement data
PQR, and verify the data by using theCP’s public
key. If failed go to Step 5.
Step 3-1-2 Obtain the information sid, oid, at,
ts, es from the requirement, and search in the
policy database for the corresponding policy
description PD according to the information.
Step 3-1-3 Call function JusUsage() to match
the user’s requirement and generate the user’s
policy.
Step 3-1-4 Generate random number𝑁
𝑝
.
Step 3-1-5 Generate the user’s policy basic data
PR
𝑢
= {sid, oid, at, 𝑇
𝑠
, 𝑇
𝑒
, 𝑘
𝑜
,Pd}.
Step 3-1-6 Generate PR Hash = Hash(PR
𝑢
‖
𝑁
𝑃
‖ 𝑁
𝐶
).
Step 3-1-7 Generate signature SigSk
𝑝
(PR Hash).
Step 3-1-8 Generate the policy data 𝑃
𝑢
= {PR
𝑢
,
SigSk
𝑝
(PR Hash),𝑁
𝑝
, 𝑁
𝐶
}.
Step 3-2 Send 𝑃
𝑢
to content server.
Step 4. CS→U data center returns the result to user.
Step 4-1 Generate the result for return
Step 4-1-1 Analyze the policy data 𝑃
𝑢
, and verify
the data by using the PS’s public key. If failed, go
to Step 5.
Step 4-1-2 Obtain the policy basic data PR
𝑢
.
Step 4-1-3 Verify the random number 𝑁
𝑐
. If
failed, go to Step 5.
Step 4-1-4 Generate the random data𝑁󸀠
𝑐
.
Step 4-1-5 Generate the basic data ECR = {𝐶󸀠,
PR
𝑢
} for return.
Step 4-1-6 Generate ECR Hash = Hash(𝐶󸀠 ‖
PR
𝑢
‖ 𝑁
󸀠
𝑐
).
Step 4-1-7 Generate signature SigSk
𝑐
(ECR
Hash).
Step 4-1-8 Generate EC
𝑢
= {ECR, SigSk
𝐶
(ECR
Hash)),𝑁󸀠
𝑐
, 𝑁
𝑢
}.
Step 4-2 Return the EC
𝑢
to the user.
Step 5. End of authorization.
(3) The Protocol for User to Read Structured Document.
Generally, the user could read the digital content by using the
specific readers. When the user obtains the final return data
ECR, his reader will verify the signature and randomnumber.
If succeeded, it will analyze the data in three steps. Firstly, the
reader gets the 𝑇
𝑠
and 𝑇
𝑒
from PRu and verifies this policy.
Secondly, it obtains the session key 𝑘 and cipher text𝐶󸀠. Policy
server could encrypt the key 𝑘 with the user’s public key, and
the reader can decrypt it with the user’s private key. Finally,
the reader will analyze the permission description Pd and
compute 𝐷
𝑘
󸀠(𝐶
󸀠
) to obtain the corresponding permission.
After obtaining the permission description, the reader will
present the corresponding digital content to the user.
(4) Security Analysis. Because the digital content has been
encrypted before submission, our protocol ensures the con-
fidentiality of the data. The requirement and data packages
transferred among the users, content providers, content
servers, and policy servers have been signed. Therefore the
integrity and nonrepudiation can be ensured. In addition, the
random numbers have been used during the transmission to
withstand the replaying attack andman-in-the-middle attack.
4. Implementation of Our Mechanism
Our system is under Windows based on C/S model, and
the framework for implementation is shown in Figure 5. The
server side consisted of the content server and policy server
and the client side includes user interface and creator inter-
face. The server side consists of user’s requirement analysis
module, verification module, action obtaining module, per-
mission assignment module, and the other universal mod-
ules like cryptography and data transforming modules. The
user’s requirement analysis module could analyze the data
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Figure 5: Framework for implementation.
packages form the users and divide them into the data stream
for document creating, policy creating, or data accessing.
The verification module will verify the integrity and the
random number by calling the cryptography module. The
action obtaining module will get the user’s role, temporal
state, and environmental state together to generate the action.
The user’s role is obtained according to sid.The temporal state
from the time server and the environmental state includes the
network, physical location, platform, or the software. In our
system,we take the network and software for experiment, and
we will improve the other factors in the future. The network
information is obtained from the user’s data packages and
the software information is initialized at the beginning. The
client will send the Hash of the client software to server when
accessing the resource. The permission assignment module
makes the decision according to the policy data base. The
format of this data base is (sid, oid, at, ts, es, perDes.xml).
Besides, the commonmodules like data based managing and
storing will not be described here.
The client side includes two types, creator and user.
The creator mode includes the document packaging mod-
ule, object dividing module, encryption module, signature
generating module, policy generating module, and some
general modules for cryptography and data transforming.
Document packaging module will compress and package the
resource uploaded by the creator and generate the structured
file in certain format. The object dividing and encrypting
module will define the objects and encrypt them according
to the file objDef.xml. The policy generating module will
return the permission describing file perDes.xml based on
the files objDef.xml and perDef.xml. The user mode consists
of user’s requirement analyzing module, document analyzing
module, user login module, and some general modules for
cryptography and data transforming. The user login module
will get the username and password. And, then, it will
decide the user’s role information and pass it the system.
The user’s requirement analyzing module will analyze the
user’s requirement and abstract the sid, oid, at to the require-
ment basic data for system. Document analyzing module
includes the submodules like content extracting, decrypt-
ing, user information obtaining, and permission assigning.
Firstly, this module extracts the content and policy and then
gets the user’s corresponding information, for example, role
and time network address, according to the policy descrip-
tion. Finally, it will display the right data and permission for
user.
The XML files mentioned above will be introduced as
follows and the analysis of them is implemented based on the
ParseXML.
(1) objDef.xml describes the division of objects, including
the object name, object ID, parent object, and content. For
example, an object named “Introduction,” whose ID is “O11”
and parent object is “O1”, could be described in Algorithm 1.
(2) perDef.xml describes the permission definition of the
certain object, including the object ID, operation type, and
action description. For example, the situation that role A can
read and write the object O11 with the IP from 172.16.1.5 to
172.16.1.35 between 8:00 am and 10:00 am could be described
in Algorithm 2.
(3) perDes.xml describes the permission information for
analysis of client, including the sid, oid, the begin and end
time, key information, and the description of permission.
According to (1) and (2), the perDes.xml for “User A” to access
“O11” is as Algorithm 3.
The tag<ko> is defined to describe the key information.
This key is encrypted by the key embedded in the client and
the user cannot obtain it, so the user can obtain the right data
only by the certain client.
By testing, the system has realized the functions of data
encryption, data decryption, and access control according to
the temporal state and network address. Also, the users can
10 The Scientific World Journal
<Obj>
<ObjName>Introduction</ObjName>
<ObjID>O11</ObjID>
<ObjFather>O1</ObjFather>
<ObjCon> Introduction The paper XXXXX</ObjCon>
</Obj>
Algorithm 1
<Permission>
<Obj>
<ObjID>O11</ObjID>
</Obj>
<Action>
<Role>A</Role>
<Time>
<after>8:00am</after>
<before>10:00am</before>
</Time>
<Environment>
<IP>
<from>172.16.1.5</from>
<to>172.16.1.35</to>
</IP>
</Environment>
</Action>
<PerDes>read&write</PerDes>
</Permission>
Algorithm 2
<sid>User A</sid>
<oid> O11</oid>
<Ts>2014-1-1</Ts>
<Te>2014-12-31</Te>
<ko> ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ </ko>
<Permission>
<Action>
<Role>A</Role>
<Time>
<after>8:00am</after>
<before>10:00am</before>
</Time>
<Environment>
<IP>
<from>172.16.1.5</from>
<to>172.16.1.35</to>
</IP>
</Environment>
</Action>
<PerDes>read&write</PerDes>
</Permission>
Algorithm 3
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only use the data on the certain client equipment. Because the
client will do the integrity authentication by communicating
with the server, the user cannot access by tampering the client
and cannot decrypt the data without the client. The keys
of our system are managed by the certificate authentication
(CA) in Figure 5. The CA realizes the functions of certificate
creating, distributing, and managing. The symmetric keys
will be generated by the creating clients and managed by
the servers. Our main focus, however, is on the designing
and implementation of the access control mechanism for
structured document based on ABAC (action-based access
control); the new technology to manage the keys, such as key
derivation functions or key hierarchy, will be discussed in the
future.
The implemented results of the system are shown in
Figure 6. The user should login the system (see Figure 6(a))
and choose the role (see Figure 6(b)). After login and role
assignment, the user can create the resource by “Document
Creation” (see Figure 6(c)) or access the resource by “User
Reader” (see Figure 6(d)). When creating a new resource,
the creator can choose the resources for packaged, decide
the algorithm for encryption, and upload the XML files for
definitions of object and permission.
Let us make an assumption that a creator has created the
resource called “Exercise 1” including the objectO1 and object
O2. O1 is the questions parts and O2 is the answers parts.
User A could apply for permission to access in the classroom
(network address: 172.16.66.5–172.16.66.90) and they can read
O1 and O2 between 8:00 am and 10:00 am; otherwise, he can
only read O1. If the user is out of the classroom, the accessing
requirements are always illegal. Results of some experiments
are shown in Figure 7. The four situations of the illegal time
and legal network address, the legal time and illegal network
address, the illegal time and network address, and the legal
time and network address are shown in Figures 7(a), 7(b),
7(c), and 7(d), respectively.
5. The Properties of Action-Based Access
Control for Structured Documents
In this section, we will make the comparison between the
current models and ours. The result is shown in Table 1.
GB-RBAC [11] and H-RBAC [12] give the group-based and
attribute-based access control for distributed computing and
cloud computing, respectively. Nevertheless, those models
are insufficient for the complicated networkwithout temporal
and environmental constraints. GTRBAC [1] extends the
temporal constraint of users and allows expressing periodic as
well as duration constraints on roles, user-role assignments,
and role-permission assignments. LRBAC (location-aware
RBAC) [2] has extended RBAC to incorporate the notion of
location, but the temporal constraint was ignored. TLRBAC
[3] and RBAC model based on space, time, and scale have
introduced the temporal state and simple environmental
state, but the environmental state only can describe the
single physical location which is not enough. In order to
describe the permission in more details, paper [7] presents
the attribute-based access control and its formal definition. It
abstracts temporal state and environmental state as attributes.
The permission assignment is based on attributes. However,
the description of attributes is too complex, and the concept
role is weakened. Action-based access control [9] integrates
the temporal state, environmental state, and role and dis-
cusses the description of environment in detail. Therefore,
it could have wide application in the MLS systems. In the
complicated network environment, flexibility and extensibil-
ity have become the vital requirements of research on access
control. Paper [13] proposes a trust and role based access
control framework in infrastructure-centric environment.
The scheme is flexible and scalable. Paper [14] presents a
dynamic access control model based on description logic
(DL). It could assign permission to a user according to
his role in a given context. Moreover, composed context
is supported. However, all the models mentioned above
have not paid enough attention to the fine-grained access
control, so they could not accommodate the requirement for
structured document. According to the description of XML,
paper [10] gives a fine-grained mandatory access control
model and its rules for XML documents. Nevertheless, the
model’s only authority is based on the users’ security level
and that of XML elements or attributes.Thus it is not suitable
for the multielement access control in the current complicate
network.
We propose an action-based fine-grained access control
for structured document by analyzing the advantages and
disadvantages of the models and mechanisms above. Our
mechanism is extended from ABAC [9]. It could imple-
ment fine-grained description of the structured document
and the authority is based on action in the complicated
network.
6. Conclusions
To solve the problem of fine-grained access control for
structured documents in the current complicated network,
this paper proposes an action-based access control mecha-
nism. By defining the objective describing model, it could
support the permission management on chapters, pages,
sections, words, and pictures of structured documents. The
corresponding protocols are given to cover different stages
in the lifecycle of structured document, including docu-
ment creation, users’ authorization, and user’s usage. Other
requirements such as preview, combination, and permission
specification are accommodated as well. Meanwhile, the
confidentiality, integrity, and nonrepudiation are ensured by
our mechanism too. In the future research, we intend to
implement the access controlmechanismwith considerations
of more factors and address the problem of dynamic adjust-
ment and combination for policy.
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Figure 6: The user interface of the system.
(a) The illegal time and legal network address (b) The legal time and illegal network address
(c) The illegal time and network address (d) The legal time and network address
Figure 7: The results of experiments.
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Table 1: Comparison between our model and current models.
Property
Model Role Temporalstate
Environmental
state Fine-grained
Permission
specification
GB-RBAC [11] YES NO NO NO NO
H-RBAC [12] YES NO NO NO NO
GTRBAC [1] YES YES NO NO NO
LRBAC [2] YES NO PART NO NO
TLRBAC [3] YES YES PART NO NO
Reference [4] YES YES PART NO NO
Attribute-based
access control [7] NO YES YES NO NO
Action-based
access control [9] YES YES YES NO NO
ITRBAC [13] YES NO PART NO NO
Reference [14] YES NO PART NO NO
Reference [10] YES NO NO PART NO
Our model YES YES YES YES YES
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